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This paper addresses the lack of legal literature in the area of death and virtual worlds. 
It sheds light on the legal status of different in-game assets, assessing whether these 
could fit within the notions of property or other relevant legal concepts such as 
intellectual property, usufruct, or easements. Having determined this, the paper goes on 
to explore the possibilities regarding the transmission of these assets on death.  
The author does not share views of a great portion of the legal literature arguing for 
recognition of ”virtual property” as a concept. Rather, this paper proposes an alternative 
solution in order to reconcile different interests arising in VWs; primarily, those of 
developers and players. Recognising a phenomenon of consitutionalisation of VWs, 
this article suggests a solution in the form of servitudes (usufruct). Virtual usufruct is 
herein conceived as player‟s entitlement to use the VW account and profit from it, if 
applicable. It is suggested that the entitlement to use the account expires on death, but 
that it allows a player‟s personal representative/executor to gain access to the account 
and extract any possible monetary value. This solution would enable players to take 
more control over their virtual assets and heirs to potentially benefit from valuable VW 
accounts. 
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The concept of virtual worlds (hereinafter: VWs) pre-dates the Internet. The history of 
Virtual Worlds started in text-based, offline role playing games, created on the basis of the 
different works of fiction such as, for instance, Tolkien‟s books and idea of world building.1 
The first text-based interactive computer game, The Colossal Cave Adventure, appeared in 
1970 with real-time interactive computer games called MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) 
appearing by the end of the 1970s.
2
 These were the first VWs. The very first was MUD1 was 
created by Richard Bartle and Roy Trubshaw at Essex University in 1979, and was the first 
online connected computer game. However, the most famous of the games to emerge from 
this group  was LambdaMOO, created by Pavel Curtis in 1990.
3
 
The literature analysing the social, economic, technological and legal aspects of virtual 
worlds originated  from the late 1990s – in relation to these text-based VWs4 – and continued 
to develop throughout the 2000s, discussing visually represented VWs and later MMOPGs 
(massively multiplayer online playing games). This literature, however, rarely addresses legal 
post-mortem aspects of VWs and gaming accounts. Legal aspects of transmission of other 
digital assets on death (e.g. emails, social networks accounts, online banking accounts, 
photos, domain names etc.) were explored to an extent following the growing importance of 
these assets in the life and death of their users,
5
 however only sporadically were virtual world 
accounts mentioned as types of digital assets.   
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This paper addresses this gap in literature and sheds light on the post-mortem legal status of 
different in-game assets (e.g. avatars, weapons, houses, land). The analysis will assess 
whether these assets could fit within the notions of property or alternatively within other 
relevant legal concepts (such as intellectual property, servitudes, easements) which would 
result in these assets being recognised as a part of a user‟s estate. 
The paper combines doctrinal and socio-legal methodology by both looking at the legal 
concepts and laws of property, contracts, IP and consumer protection in their correlation with 
specificities and by exploring the peculiar nature of VWs in the wide socio-economic and 
humanities literature. 
2. Conceptualisation of VWs 
From a linguistic perspective, VWs could be defined as states of human existence; states 
which do not exist physically, are not real, but appear nonetheless to be real from the point of 
view of the program or user.
6 
From this definition we could extract the most important 
features that define VWs: computer-moderation; persistence; environmental attributes 
(immersive and persuasive worlds; mimicking the real world); interactivity; and the 
participation of multiple individuals.
7
 
Developers use different business models for their VWs. Some of them are closed, used for 
military or business simulations, whereas others are open, commercial worlds where users 
can join for free either for a monthly fee payment (World of Warcraft) or on a freemium basis 
where basic services are free and others have their price (Second Life for instance).
8
 
The umbrella term for VWs is the term MMOPGs, but these can be divided on the basis of 
their player community and structure into „game‟ worlds on the one hand and „social‟ worlds 
on the other. In „game‟ VWs (known by the term: massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games - or MMORPGs), players take on a specific role and compete to achieve certain 
predefined goals (World of Warcraft for example). In „social‟ or unstructured worlds the 
emphasis is placed on interaction with other players and with the environment (e.g. Second 
Life, IMVU). These latter VWs are not, therefore, games but rather platforms for social 
                                                          
6
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interaction, or “mirror worlds”.9  It is also possible to distinguish a third kind of VWs in kids‟ 
worlds, which target children as the main player base (e.g. Club Penguin).
10
  
According to the technology employed to enable access to the worlds they are divided into 
client-based worlds  and those where the players can join simply online. Some video games, 
including some VWs (e.g. The Lord of the Rings Online, Dungeons & Dragons Online, 
Everquest II, Diablo et.al.) can also be accessed from intermediaries. The most prominent of 
these is an entertainment platform called STEAM.
11
  
This paper will focus on two examples specifically: World of Warcraft and Second Life. The 
reason for choosing these two US based VWs, as opposed to those based elsewhere, stems 
from a combination of the fact that most of the successful Western VWs are hosted in the 
US;
12
 that choice of law provisions usually point to the US law; and that the majority of 
common law cases have been resolved in this jurisdiction.
13
  Additionally, these examples 
were also chosen for their domination of the market and user base, their impact and their 
“cultural footprint”.14 Despite the fact that Second Life is currently perceived as declining in 




The term virtual assets, for the purpose of this discussion, will be used to describe any item, 
object or asset found in VWs and which is used or created by the players (e.g. avatars, 
weapons, land, houses, clothes, furniture, etc.). Before initiating the discussion on the concept 
of virtual property (VP) and whether in-game assets are property transmissible on death the 
following section will present a classification of virtual assets as potential objects of property 
in VWs, to be used in the subsequent analysis throughout this paper. 
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 G Lastowka Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 
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15
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2.1. Layers of virtual assets  
The term „virtual assets‟ is used instead of „virtual property‟ to avoid any connotations 
regarding the potential legal nature of these assets. Later in this paper, the term will be 
replaced with “virtual worlds usufruct” in an adaptation to the findings of this paper. Until 
then, the short form of VAs will be used. It is also important at this point to differentiate VAs 
from digital assets, with the latter defined as any asset of value online potentially capable of 
post-mortem transmission (e.g. social network accounts, emails, domain names, digital music 
etc.).
16
    
The majority of virtual property theories tend to confuse different types of code and content 
in VWs, equating the underlying software (the building blocks of VWs) and the user 
generated content (virtual assets). In this regard, Abramovitch offers a helpful theory and 
proposes three levels whereby property/VAs can possibly be identified within VWs.
17
 At the 
first level sits the developer‟s code, which is protected by IP as software. This level, 
therefore, represents software and code that determines the properties and features of VWs 
and their user‟s actions and behaviours. At the second level, Abramovitch identifies objects 
or items inside the VW which resemble real world items (objects like avatars, weapons, 
buildings, clothing, cars, spaceships, and houses) while at the third level, she identifies in-
game virtual assets that could potentially also be protected by Intellectual Property (e.g. a 
book that is found lying on a table inside the VW).  
The layer approach is useful for the purpose of this analysis for two main reasons: Firstly, it  
offers a more nuanced approach and does not represent the unified, rigid “player-deserves-
all” (that virtual property should belong to the players) or “developer-deserves-all” (property 
in servers/IP in software should extend to the virtual realm) dichotomy usually found in the 
early 2000s literature. These two approaches fail to recognise, on the one hand, the 
consitutionalisation of virtual worlds (explained further below) and their significance for 
player and, on the other, the intellectual property interests of developers.  
Secondly, this approach acknowledges the Internet architecture and the fact that significant 
investments are made by the world owners while assessing at the same time the rights of the 
users at a different game level. This differentiation opens the possibility for discussion and 
suggests recognising different legal concepts at different levels of code/virtual reality, 
offering as such some compromising and more widely acceptable legal solutions.
18
 
Generally, protection for the different layers could be provided for by Intellectual property, 
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 L Edwards and E Harbinja, see note 5 above. 
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The analysis in this paper will accept and use this classification, focusing primarily on the 
second level.
20
 The first level is excluded as it is not generally disputed that the underlying 
code indeed belongs to the developer (and is protected therefore by copyright or patent in 
software and property in the physical servers).
21
 Thus, the first level will be discussed only to 
the extent it relates to or determines the second and third levels. Apart from having a clearer 
legal nature, the first level is also beyond the scope of this paper as this paper looks at the 
player‟s ability to transmit their virtual assets on death; a situation which is inconceivable in 
the case of the first level due to this usually involving a company‟s asset. In the case of the 
third level, this will be mentioned sporadically but, due to the limited scope of this paper, the 
IP issues will not be analysed in details. Rather, property and proprietary rights is the 
intended focus. 
3. Virtual property  
3.1. Introduction 
Virtual Property is a theoretical construct about property rights in the items and resources 
originating and existing in VWs. Much has been written pro and contra the recognition of 
virtual property. However, it is still a concept existing mainly in academic discussions and 
courts or legislators have not recognised its importance. There have been some judicial 
attempts to address virtual property (see for example Bragg or Evans below), but there have 
not been any legislative efforts to do so at all. This section aims therefore to shed light on 
virtual property and, more specifically, to explore whether there should be property rights in 
VWs and the potential alternatives if not. 
The key in recognising something as property is, first, to identify the relevant theoretical 
justifications.
22
 This section will refer to the leading western justifications of propertisation – 
labour theory, utilitarianism and personhood theory – in this regard, discussing their potential 




 For more details about the copyright protection in VWs see S R Dow et.al. “Authorship in Virtual Worlds: 
Author's Death to Rights Revival?” (2013) 6(3) Journal of Virtual Worlds Research 1-15; or D Miller, 
“Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License Agreements” (2003) 22 The Review of 
Litigation 435-471. 
21
 E.g. cases such as SAS Institute v World Programming C-406/10 and Nova Productions v Mazooma Games 
[2007] RPC 25 suggest that graphics in computer games could be regarded as artistic works and protected by 
copyright, 
22
 Erlank argues that virtual property could be more easily recognised in common law systems, as these „just 
require a good justification‟: W Erlank, see note 1 above, at 252. 





application to virtual assets and VWs. The analysis will use the layer classifications explained 
in the previous section. 
The discussion in the following sections will be based on the two main assertions: first, that 
virtual assets are valuable for the various reasons identified below and therefore generally 
deserve an academic account; and second, that virtual assets are qualitatively different from 
the other types of digital assets discussed in the literature so far. This significance of virtual 
assets, discussed subsequently through the lenses of property theories, can be subsumed 
under the following three categories: intimate/personal value; social importance; and 
economic value. This categorisation is offered as a result of the analysis of different 
arguments offered by a range of socio-economic and legal theorists of VWs. However, it will 
not be discussed separately, but rather as an integral part of the theories explored further 
below. 
3.2. Justifications    
3.2.1. Labour theory 
Many authors contend that Locke‟s labour theory is applicable to virtual property. The main 
argument here is that time and effort that users put in while creating virtual assets should 
entitle them to claim property rights in respect to such assets.
23
  
Empirical research indicates that players spend significant periods of time in VWs. For 
instance, in 2010, research showed that online video games were the second most used 
activity on the Internet in the US, consuming 10.2% of Internet time.
24
 This research, 
however, does not provide data on the use of VWs in particular. In addition, an earlier survey 
found that 35% of adults who used the Internet played online video games, but that only 2% 
visit a VW such as Second Life. However, those individuals who are active in Second 
Life average about 40 hours a month in this VW.
25
 Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley assert 
that 9.4 million players are each “in-world” for about 22 hours per week, claiming that 
“subscribers to VWs could be devoting over 213 million hours per week to building their 
virtual lives.”.26 
                                                          
23
 R Shikowitz, “License to Kill: MDY v. Blizzard and the Battle over Copyright in World of Warcraft” (2009-
2010) 75 The Brooklyn Law Review, 1015-1054. 
24
 M. Lasar “Most Internet time now spent with social networks, games” (2010) available at 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2010/08/nielsen-social-networking-and-gaming-up-email-uncertain/ (accessed 
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 V Mayer-Schoenberger and J R Crowley “Napster's Second Life? - The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual 
Worlds” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review, 1775-1826, at 1787; H Mahmassani et.al. “Time to 





On the first obvious question of whether we could consider “game playing” as labour, it is 
argued that labour in the form of “grinding” can be deemed as relevant for the purpose of 
labour theory. Grinding is a series of repetitive menial actions in VWs, completed in order to 
level-up ones character.
27
 In addition, the quality of labour can be demonstrated by looking at 
the phenomenon of “gold farming”. Gold-farmers are a particular sub-set of users who 
dedicate their hours “in game” specifically to creating assets of value for the purpose of later 
sale on either in-game or grey markets.
28
 Gold farms, or “gaming workshops”, are places that 
might employ a few dozen such farmers who perform various tasks specific to a certain game 
in order to build up virtual currency for the farm owners.
29
 Although the data on this practice 
is rather uneven, there are nonetheless some quite staggering estimates of the value of this 
“virtual economy”. Heeks, for instance estimated in 2010 that approximately 400,000 people 
were employed in gold farming, of which perhaps 85% were based in China and Ryan 
estimates that one million gold farmers are working on a global trade worth more than $10 
billion in total.
30
 Therefore, the labour is already recognised as such in these black or grey 
markets. 
The argument against applying labour theory to VWs however stems from the fact that the 
majority of players play these games for entertainment purposes and not for gold-farming or 
labouring in general. Therefore, the time playing a game cannot qualify as adequate labour 
for the purpose of labour theory.
31
 Erlank replies to this objection by noting that not all the 
worlds are used for the purpose of entertainment (some are, indeed, used for many other 
purposes including education, business, and politics), and that the real world also rewards 
individuals who play games there; giving in this regard the example of athletes as 
professionals are paid. Second, he comments that some players do indeed “labour” by  




Advocates of applying Locke‟s theory to virtual property also argue that it is fairly easy to 
satisfy Locke‟s “enough and as good” proviso in VWs: the proviso, in short, that an 
individual can appropriate an object under the condition that there is enough and as good left 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Play? Activity Engagement in Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games”. (2010) Journal of the Transportation 
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for the others (although this proviso was subsequently revised by Locke
33
). In VWs, 
arguably, an infinite number of resources are available for the players to labour and create.
34
 
This, however, does not have to be taken as self-evident as the abundance of the VW 
resources depends on the developers‟ actions and, for some, the users do need to pay and do 
not labour (e.g. land in Second Life). The developers, therefore, can (and often do) artificially 
create a scarcity of resources in their virtual world. On the other hand,  in-game resources are 
arguably available to all the players under the same conditions and the developers can adjust 
the scarcity feature according to their desires, making more resources available if needed.  
Consequently, looking at a VW as a self-contained entity, this proviso does ultimately seem 
fulfilled.   
According to the proponents of applying labour theory to virtual property, Locke‟s spoilage 
proviso is also satisfied. This refers to the argument that the labourer is limited to “as much as 
anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils.”.35 The argument is that for 
the self-evident reasons of the nature of virtual assets (namely the underlying code that 
determines them) they cannot be spoilt and are similar in this regard to money. Therefore, the 
limitation is unnecessary for VWs since developers produce virtual assets or enable their 
creation by the players. The limitation is embedded in the underlying VW‟s code. 
However, Lastowka and Hunter criticise this justification for virtual property, basing their 
arguments on Nozick‟s general objection to Locke‟s theory, viz. that the labour which users 
embed in the VWs is insignificant compared to that of the owners of VWs.
36
 Opponents of 
Nozick‟s argument argue that for some property labour, no matter how insignificant it seems, 
still adds value to the resource and recreates the essence of it.
37
 Similarly, Lastowka and 
Hunter reply to this objection arguing that while it is correct in the sense that a player cannot 
claim property in the whole VW they do deserve property in those items where their labour 
makes up the greatest part of the value. They assert that players do not claim property in the 
world itself, but rather only in their items and avatars.
38
  
                                                          
33
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Blackwell, 1974), at 175. 
37 G S Alexander and E M Pe alver An Introduction to property theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 48. 
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The most commonly articulated objection to applying Locke‟s theory to virtual property is 
the same one used against propertisation of IP; the absence of commons.
39
 According to this 
argument, the initial stage from which appropriation takes place – the commons – does not 
exist here and VWs are not common ab initio but are usually owned by the developers. 
Therefore, they seem to have better claims according to labour theory, as they actually invest 
their labour and resources in creating VWs.
40
  
Cifrino shares this stance, noting that if any labour, and not only the labour on the initial 
commons, would create property rights, then the borrowing and sharing of any object would 
be a problem if someone later labours on that object and claims the title allegedly resulting.
41
 
Other authors reply to this contending that the comparison could be made to the Locke‟s 
commons created by god: VWs‟s commons are created by their “gods”, or by someone with 
godlike powers in respect to at least them in their developers.
42
 In addition, for those arguing 
that IP is property in essence, the absence of commons can be bypassed and interpreted 
widely as has happened practically.
43
 
Prima facie, labour theory therefore presents a good justification for recognising property in 
the second-level VW‟s code, as this code satisfies both the labour requirement and  its two 
provisos (spoilage and “enough and as good”). In addition, a player‟s labour constitutes the 
greatest part of the virtual assets value. For the first level items, understandably, developer‟s 
labour and investments constitutes the biggest part of its value, and thus they should remain 
entitled to own this layer.  
However, the lack of the commons here is problematic as one cannot argue that there is any 
common of ideas, facts or resources in VWs
44
. One way to neutralise this limitation would be 
to recognise the godlike powers of the developers and analogise them with god and Locke‟s 
common. Alternatively, if the second layer is perceived separately and furthermore in relation 
to the other players and not the developer then the VWs features, which are open to all, can 
instead be seen as the commons. 
                                                          
39
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42
 W Erlank, see note 1 above, at 156-157. 
43
 See e.g. J. Peterson “Lockean property and literary works“ (2008) 14(4) Legal Theory, 257-280. 
44
 Apart from, perhaps, open sources games which are not in the focus of this analysis. 





3.2.2. Personhood theory of virtual property 
Personhood theories originate from Hegel‟s conception of property as an extension of 
personality,
45
 and from Radin‟s classifications of property as fungible and personal. For 
Radin, property is an essential vehicle for the development of the personality and, therefore, 
property which is especially close to person's self-definition deserves special legal protections 
and precedence over fungible property.
46
   
This theory is, arguably, more applicable for justifying property interests in virtual assets than 
even traditional property.
47
 In VWs, players are represented by a character, or avatar,
48
 which 
is essentially the player‟s agent for interacting with environment. 49  An avatar, and 
consequently a player, generally leads a more or less full, rich, and interesting life in VWs, 
often as a simulation of the real world. Using their avatars but also offline, in the real world, 
players communicate and socialise with others, gain reputation and acquire social capital. 
In most VWs, players usually establish extremely firm ties with their avatars, conceiving 
them as extensions of themselves and their alter egos.
50
 A large body of research of VWs 
confirms this, referring to the concept of immersion.
51
 Bartle, for instance, argues that VWs 
are all about “the celebration of identity” and summarises the path players follow in game in 
the phrase: “locate to discover to apply to internalise.” This refers to the player‟s 
development from acquiring skills, to achieving something in the world (whatever its specific 
goals are), to exploring the world and applying the skills, finishing with internalising the 
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world and complete immersion in it.
52
 The concept of immersion in VWs is tied to presence 
and to an illusion that this computer mediated environment is not in fact mediated, but is 
real.
53
 The result of this “hill-climbing activity through identity space” is “that players 
understand themselves more.”54 Similarly, Lastowka shows immersion using the example of 
the use of language and in particular the pronouns “you” when referring to another person‟s 
avatar and “I” when referring to their own avatar‟s actions.55 
The argument against using this theory to justify virtual property is found in the inalienability 
of personal property, as suggested by Radin and achieved, for instance, in the case of 
intellectual property moral rights on the Continent.
56
 The result of such an approach would be 
to proclaim avatars and other second level virtual assets inalienable, since they are so 
intrinsically related to a person. This is, however, not desirable as some users in some of the 
VWs do in practice want to trade their avatars and such avatars often reach a considerable 
price on the markets.
57
  
Lastowka and Hunter maintain that, even if this could be the case, on the practical side it is 
not a certain outcome as the courts might conclude otherwise and permit virtual trade.
58
 In 
addition, if classified as personal property virtual assets would be protected better than the 
fungible property – i.e. the developers‟ property – raising more disputes than providing 
solutions.
59
 On the other hand, the fact that something might be deemed non-transferable 
does not necessarily exclude its proprietary character (e.g. common, public property).  
An objection to this theory in general, and its application to virtual assets in particular, can be 
found in the argument of “separability” or “thinghood”; that the things, in order to be 
property, must not be conceived as “an aspect of ourselves or our on-going personality-rich 
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relationships to others” (for example blood, body parts, and personal data).60 This objection is 
particularly applicable to avatars as property when the rich relation between the players and 
their avatar is borne in mind, but is less applicable to less personal VWs items such as 
swords, castles, or houses. 
To conclude, personhood theories could potentially serve as a good basis for justifying virtual 
property in the second and third level of code in VWs: Those closely related to the player‟s 
personality, items and creations. The application of this theory, as demonstrated above, is not 
without difficulties and dilemmas however and would not always serve the interests of the 
players. 
3.2.3. Utilitarian theory  
Amongst the theories used in this paper, utilitarian theory is least applicable to virtual 
property in the second layer virtual assets. The main problem here would be in the usefulness 
of virtual property for society and real world non-players. Such an approach would 
potentially conflict with the felicific calculus principle of utilitarianism which seeks “the 
greatest good for the greatest number”.61  
Lastowka and Hunter, however, would not agree with this assertion, claiming that in-game 
assets from the utilitarian perspective do not need to be useful for society but only useful and 
valuable for the individuals engaging in creating and improving these assets. Therefore, for 
them, if the society (the VW) is perceived as aggregation of individuals (players), then the 
utilitarian concept could perhaps be used. According to this view a recognition of virtual 
property would reward users for their efforts and incentivise them to create further and 
develop VWs.
62
 An example for this could be found, for example, in the exponential growth 
of Second Life users after its developer Linden labs changed their terms of service and 
promised players ownership their creations .
63
  
On the contrary however it can be argued that players are already incentivised to create and 
that one of the major factors why they chose to join a particular VW is creation. Property in 
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virtual assets would therefore probably not make much difference. Being in VWs already 
potentially results in economic benefits for the players as players can exchange their virtual 
assets for real money in many VWs, known as Real Money Trading (RMT).  
RMT includes two main components: One that takes place within the game and is in 
accordance with the End User Licence Agreements (EULAs)
64
; and a second which takes 
place outside the game and beyond the EULA‟s provisions. The players can trade and make 
money from the sale of virtual assets on online auctions within or out with the VW, although 
some of the VWs expressly ban the use of external auctions (e.g. World of Warcraft – see 
Blizzard‟s World of Warcraft EULA). For instance, in 2006 Anshe Chung accumulated more 
than one million dollars in virtual assets, becoming the first millionaire of the popular VW 
Second Life.
65
 In December 2009, a person known as “Buss Erik Lightyear” paid $330,000 to 
own a virtual space station in Planet Calypso, a MMORPG.
66
 This latter game allows 
exchanges between virtual currency and real dollars at a fixed exchange rate of 10 PED 
(virtual currency) to $1 US dollar .
67
 Overall, Wu estimates that the market for virtual goods 
in the U.S. exceeded $3 billion in 2012 and “is expected to grow briskly in later years.”68 In 
2013 Linden Labs reported 1.2 million daily transactions for virtual goods and a total of $3.2 
billion worth of transactions in the Second Life Economy.
69
 However, it is still unclear 
whether there could be a further explosion in the numbers of VWs users and their 
transactions, provided that virtual property is recognised.  
The incentives argument therefore works much better for the developers. Creating and 
maintaining a VW can be a very profitable business deal as they can earn revenue from a 
range of different sources – subscriptions, virtual sale commission, purchase of land and 
other features included.
70
 In order to achieve this, understandably, they need to have a 
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significant user base, one which may be incentivised perhaps by virtual property rights.
 71
 In 
addition, they need to have their rights in the first layer virtual assets in order to prevent free 
riding on their creations.  
The free riding arguments (arguments against allowing an individual to obtain benefits from 
someone else‟s investment, preventing them to recoup costs) are also somewhat applicable to 
the second layer in the sense that the VWs, as a society, take advantage and become more 
attractive for new users with these creations profiting the developers in turn.
72
 Another 
imaginable scenario is free riding of other players, replicating and copying other player‟s 
creations.  
Free riding, however, as noted by Lemley for IP rights, might even be desirable in the case of 
VWs, as there is much less need to internalise negative externalities. Similarly to the case of 
IP, negative externalities are less prominent here in comparison with the tangible property as 
consumption by many players is desirable given that this enriches the society and culture of 
VWs.
73
 Also, the lack of scarcity in virtual worlds means that free-riding would not result in 
serious detriment as the developers could make more resources available to players. 
Conversely, one of the arguments contra the use of this justification for virtual property is the 
allocation reason. According to this view, utilitarian theories could be used to oppose the 
creation of property rights in VW since these would decrease the welfare of VWs‟ owners 
and other users by giving property to individuals and creating, effectively, the tragedy of 
anticommons; a situation where individuals would be able to prevent the use of virtual 
property and which would result in unwanted underuse of virtual worlds by players.
74
 
Lastowka and Hunter reply to these arguments by saying that they do not consider the 
justification for allocation but rather for the creation of property rights in virtual goods, and 
that that it should not be the case that property shouldn‟t exist in VWs just because it is not 
properly allocated. This can be corrected, for instance, by the courts.
75
 This response does not 
however address the objection adequately. Rather, the nature of VWs and the layer approach 
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would prevent underuse, as the first layer belongs to the developers and the rights in the 
second one are derived from this ownership. 
In summary, all the leading normative arguments for propertisation provide on the one hand 
some support for recognising virtual property. On the other hand however, these theories 
encounter many difficulties as elaborated above. The layer structure of virtual worlds does 
though allow for more creative solutions based on these theories. One of these solutions is 
virtual worlds usufruct, which is explored in the concluding part of this paper. 
3.3. Features of property vs virtual property 
After having discussed the potential normative justifications of virtual property it is next 
necessary to look at the features of both property and property objects and in order to identify 
whether virtual property and second layer virtual assets share these features.  
The leading analysis of virtual property and its features for this purpose is that of Fairfield. 
He lists three major criteria, or features of property, borrowing from the law and economics 
literature.
76
 These main features are: rivalrousness, permanence and interconnectedness. 
Castronova et. Al. use the same features as those inherent in the physical objects
77
 in their 
attempt to define and justify virtual property. Some authors also identify further features 
(such as scarcity
78
, or secondary markets; and value-added-by-users.).
79
 The analysis in the 
following section will add tangibility to this list as it is both an important feature of property 
historically and is still retained as such by some jurisdictions (England, for instance).  
3.3.1. Tangibility  
A potential problem that any argument in favour of virtual property in second and third layers 
would encounter is their alleged lack of tangibility. This problem would not necessarily be as 
significant for civil law countries, as these do generally recognise property in intangibles; 
either in their civil code, like France;
80
 or by establishing a separate category of constitutional 
property, like Germany.
81
 This could however be more difficult for the English common law 
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system which refuses to consider intangibles as property in at least some cases (information) 
but which does decide to recognise it in others, e.g. IP.
82
 .  
The intangibility of second layer virtual assets (intangible at least for the purpose of the 
classical legal definitions, lacking real world tangibility or corporeality due to consisting of 
code), would therefore present an obstacle for recognising virtual property in English 
common law. Fewer issues would emerge in the US law, as the courts have been mostly 
ready to recognise property in intangibles (for instance, fresh news).
83
 
Taking this point even further, it can be suggested that this layer does not even have to be 
considered intangible at all. Second layer virtual assets are tangible for an avatar and, if the 
level of immersion in the VW is very high, then they could consequently be tangible for the 
player as well.
84
 This is, however, a novel argument which at the moment is highly unlikely 
to be accepted in the English courts.   
3.3.2. Rivalrousness 
The analysis will further be based on the features identified by Fairfield in his seminal work 
on virtual property (2005). The first feature he identifies is rivalrousness; that the 
consumption cannot be common for a rivalrous resource and so one person‟s possession and 
consumption physically excludes other pretenders to the same resource.
85
 
Fairfield thus discusses the possibility of applying the traditional concept of property, 
designed for chattels rather than intellectual property, to virtual property that mimics the real 
and offline (namely layer two virtual assets in our classification). He distinguishes between 
the computer software code, designed as non-rivalrous  and protected by IP at layer 1, and 
other type of rivalrous code, which are “designed to act more like land or chattel than 
ideas”.86I If one person controls it, the others cannot.  
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Rivalrousness is therefore a physical quality of an object, different from the idea of 
exclusivity which refers to an individual‟s power to control the use of an object.87 Other 
commentators used the term exclusivity as a synonym for rivalrousness.
88
 This is however 
wrong, and Fairfield therefore rightly notes that exclusivity is a function of rivalrousness and 
a quality that can be assigned to non-rivalrous objects by law or technology (for instance IP 
creations and DRM).  
It is important to note in this regard his observation that this code is rivalrous because it is 
made that way and that this is a constituent part of the Internet.
89
 Examples of this code are 
domain names, URLs, websites, email accounts, and VW items. Fairfield also warns of the 
confusion in trying to fit all intangibles in a category of non-rivarous objects
90
. Other authors 








Critics claim to the contrary that virtual property and virtual assets are inherently non-
rivalrous in nature. Nelson, for instance, disputes claims of rivalrousness, or rather 
exclusivity, of virtual goods and using the same examples – URLs and emails – claims that 
the alleged owner cannot control this property to the exclusion of others. According to the 
contract that a user concludes to acquire these the developer retains the ability to control the 
resources. Similarly, Glushko argues that the ease of copying code in the case of any digital 
property would also undermine an argument of virtual property exclusivity.
94
  
These authors have however again confused the notions of exclusivity, which is an economic 
and legal feature and which relates to the rights conferred by contracts or property, and that 
of rivalrousness which is a purely physical feature. Even if a provider retains the exclusive 
control over a virtual resource the fact that only one user can, arguably, physically experience 
it means that the resource is indeed rivalrous.  
In summary therefore, rivalrousness is a feature of second level virtual property. The problem 
with this feature is its unstable nature, as it only exists if it has been created in that form by 
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the developer. However, this should not be an issue since, ultimately, VWs are unstable too 
and would not exist if they were not created as such by developers. Indeed, players and many 
theorists (including this author) still accept the VWs as such claiming that, however unstable 
and peculiar places they may be,  they still represent replicas of the real world. In addition, 
even if we were to accept that VW items are not rivalrous in nature this would still not be a 
decisive point in favour of discarding protection as precedence exists for other non-rivalrous 
resources – specifically IP resources – to still be protected like, or similarly to, property. 
3.3.3. Permanence 
Permanence or persistence of VWs and in-game assets is another disputed feature, present in 
the case of physical property and also disputed in the case of IP. Castronova defines 
persistence as the feature of VWs which enables them to “continue to run whether anyone is 
using [them] or not.”95 Fairfield, like Castronova, argues that code is persistent since “it does 
not fade after each use, and it does not run on one single computer.”96 The code of a VW can 
be accessed from a variety of devices and it is located (and persists) on the servers of service 




However, this code can be accessed and modified anytime by the developer presenting an 
important weakness to this argument. Similarly, Erlank notes that its permanence depends on 
the cooperation of the developers, who can make the virtual property disappear at any time.
98
 
Chein warns therefore that VWs are ephemeral and dynamic environments and virtual 
property can be lost “at the accidental flick of a power switch”.99 Cifrino also notes the 
potential risks posed by the obsolescence of VW business models, giving the example of the 
City of Heroes VW which ceased operations in 2012 after eight years.
100
 
Another issue related to the potential disappearance of VWs is the lack of interoperability 
between software in different VW.
101
 When user‟s account has been restricted or terminated 
by one developer it cannot therefore be moved to another. There have been some efforts 
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towards making property in one VW compatible with the software of another VW but until 
this is implemented the quality of permanence remains rather dubious.
102
 
Lastowka and Hunter claim that temporality is a weak argument against virtual property. 
They use the examples of lease or usufruct, both of which are property interests recognised in 
common law that are nonetheless time-limited. Due to its time-limited protection (i.e. 70 
years post-mortem in the EU and US) intellectual property also serves as another similar 
example.
103
 Therefore, while the issue of the lack of permanence in the second and third layer 
virtual assets could serve as a solid argument against virtual property in the classical 
conceptions of property this does not necessarily exclude proposing some other proprietary 
models for protecting virtual assets similar to IP. 
3.3.4. Interconnectedness 
Fairfield also argues that another VW quality is interconnectivity, analogous to this 
characteristic of objects in the real world (as player can experience the connected world; they 




, Fairfield argues that “code 
can be made interconnected, so that although one person may control it, others may 
experience it.” As Erlank notes, if there was no interconnectivity in VWs, players would be 




However, code is not necessarily interconnected as not all computer systems can run all the 
code without necessary adjustments and, furthermore, we have a problem of interoperability 
as seen in the discussion on permanence in the section above.
107
 
In summary, second level virtual assets (according to Abramovich‟s categorisation) 
potentially possess all the important physical characteristics of typical “real world” object 
(i.e. rivalrousness, permanence, interconnectedness). However, these features are very 
peculiar in the case of VWs as they depend on the developers and their behaviour; whether 
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they make these items in such a way that they possess the relevant features. In addition, 
virtual assets lack tangibility which is one of the prerequisites of property in some 
jurisdictions.  
Nevertheless, if we look at the VWs as such their characteristics and if we recognise their 
nature, importance and value that they hold for players one cannot simply discard any kind of 
protection for the players and their assets. It is argued in this paper that the most sensible 
approach to resolve this tension would be a compromise solution; one which would recognise 
certain proprietary rights of the players and yet which would recognise the fact that these 
right depend on the first level code of the developer‟s system and software.   
4. Allocation of virtual assets ownership 
Before proposing a solution, the current model of ownership in VWs, the allocation of 
property will be analysed. Most developers in practice curtail the possibilities for players to 
assert any virtual property rights in their second level virtual assets. Moreover, even where 
developers envisage some kind of player‟s property rights in their EULAs (e.g. Second Life), 
these rights are very limited and can barely be categorised as property at all.  
The solution to rectify this imbalance is potentially available in the form of consumer 
protection. However, due to the special character of VWs and the areas that these contracts 
aim to regulate, consumer protection laws do not prove very helpful. Allocation of 
ownership, IP and other rights in VWs is established through contracts. VWs contracts come 
in the form of click wrap licences (End User Licence Agreements – EULAs; Terms of 
Service – ToS; rules of conduct; and other policies)108 and the effects of these contracts are 
widely disputed. They leave little or no freedom for the user and give no other choice apart 
from agreeing or declining in the entirety, the later effectively amounting to refusing to take 
part in the game.
109
 The most common model contained in these contracts at the moment is 
that the developer claims all property and IP rights
110
 associated with the VW. Indeed 
Blizzard, the World of Warcraft developer, expressly excludes the grant of any property 
rights for users in assets created or traded in the game, in addition to forbidding transfers of 
accounts (S. 4 and 5 World of Warcraft EULA).  
Second Life and Linden Labs, conversely, used to give relatively extensive rights in content 
created by the users. Initially, Linden labelled these rights as property but, in response to 
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Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,
111
 they later changed their terms to grant IP right only.
112
 
They also deny property rights in their virtual currency (Linden dollars) and property rights in 
the land that users can buy in Second Life, reminding the user instead of the limited licence 
that they are granted.
113
 Moringiello argues that, Linden deceives its users in this regard as it 
effectively promises something that resembles the bundle of rights in land – i.e. property – 
and then takes it back by the way of the terms of service.
114
 As Erlank rightly notes, even the 
recognised rights are rather illusory, as Linden limits their scope to the game and refuses any 
liability or compensation in the case of damage or loss of this property.
115
 Nevertheless, he 
also reasonably opines that by insisting on regulating and limiting virtual property, the 
developer does at least implicitly recognise the existence of virtual property.
116
 
On the other hand, Linden also grants themselves a non-exclusive licence in players‟ 
creations, the scope of which has been widened even more recently to the displeasure of 
many players of Second Life.
117
 Also, their EULA has caused Linden Labs to be involved in 
the most important court cases about VWs and virtual property in the western world. 
The first and most famous VWs case is that of Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.
118
 In this case 
Marc Bragg sued the owners of Second Life, Linden Research, after they expelled him from 
the online community and reclaimed his virtual assets, “effectively confiscating all of the 
virtual property and currency that he maintained on his account” (which at the time held 
roughly $2,000 in real-world money on account). Linden Lab expelled Marc Bragg claiming 
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that he had violated their Terms of Service by improperly buying in game land at an auction. 
Second Life moved to compel arbitration according to the terms of its service agreement.  
Bragg, however, argued that the contractual terms between Bragg and Second Life were 
unconscionable because the service agreement assumed too much power and was 
unreasonably biased against the user. The court on this point confirmed that the terms of 
service were unconscionable in relation to the arbitration clause and knocked down the 
mandatory arbitration clause.
119
 They focused on the fact that there was an element of 
surprise due to hidden or missing terms, as there was no notice of the serious expense and 
inconvenience to the plaintiff  that participation in the arbitration would entail. The court 
stated that the terms therefore left plaintiff with no effective remedy.
120
  
Californian law was applied in the analysis of the contract, and the court noted that to find 
unconscionability in California, it must find both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.
121
 It found both elements and concluded that the arbitration clause was 
thus unconscionable.
122
 This case was however not decided on the issue of virtual property: 
The property claim was initially brought up by Bragg, who asserted that his in-game assets 
were in fact his property, but the court, unfortunately, did not discuss it. Virtual property, as 
demonstrated earlier, therefore still remains at the level of academic debates. 
More recently in the case of Evans et al v. Linden Research, Inc. et al
123
 a group of Second 
Life users complained that they had purchased virtual items and/or virtual land and had later 
had their accounts unilaterally terminated or suspended by Linden. These players claimed to 
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own their virtual assets and were unhappy that they were not compensated for the value of the 
virtual land, items, and/or currency in their accounts. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that 
Linden had made false representations when it came to the ownership of virtual land and 
virtual items and had wrongfully confiscated these items from the class members they sought 
to represent.
124
 Linden disputed the claimed ownership in virtual assets but did recognise 
however IP rights in general in users‟ creations and copyright in particular.125 The central 
issue was again the fairness and validity of the contract provisions about suspension of 
accounts and users compensation. 
Again, there was no decision in respect of virtual property in Evans. The case was settled and 
Linden agreed to return up to 100% of the U.S. dollar balances to the PayPal accounts of the 
plaintiffs; up to 100% of the Linden dollar balances in class members' accounts; to pay 
two Linden dollars per square meter of virtual land held by class members; and to pay $15 
per class member to his or her PayPal account or, alternatively, to allow the class members to 
attempt to sell their virtual items on the Second Life Marketplace with Second Life's 
commission on the sales waived.
126
 This example might illustrate Linden‟s attitude and 
concerns over virtual property through their willingness to compensate the users instead of 
proceeding with a case which might find some kind of property in virtual items and land. 
Even the “liberal” VWs/games seem to be replicating these EULAs. An example of this is 
STEAM, an entertainment platform for distributing many different games including VWs. 
This very successful platform is considered to be user-friendly, open-source to an extent and 
an alternative to the traditional business models.
127
 Valve, the owner of STEAM, created a 
very restrictive EULA (in its Subscriber Agreement), resembling closely those of the other 
VWs. Therefore, apart from IP rights,
128
 player ownership of their creations and the virtual 
money contained in their wallets
129
 is limited, non-transferable, and subject to a wide licence 
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taken by the provider, Valve Corporation.
130
 Valve has been criticised for banning a user 
under these terms who, contrary to the EULA, attempted to sell his STEAM account.
131
  
Following the above analysis, it could be argued, as many authors indeed do, that the 
contracts are prima facie unfair.
132
 The reasonable remedy for this would therefore be to 




Is consumer protection law helpful? At the level of the EU, Directive 2011/83/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights would 
apply
134
. This Directive, implemented in the UK
 
in the form of The Consumer Contracts 
(Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (No. 3134), 
encompasses contracts regarding digital content including games (See recital 19 of the 
Directive). Additionally, at the UK level The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 would potentially apply if we recognise that users do act like consumers 
when purchasing the licence to use software to enter the VW. According to these 
Regulations, terms that would be potentially deemed as invalid are, for example, terms 
limiting the liability of the developer, reserving the right to terminate or modify terms 
discretionary and without notice, and arbitration clauses etc..
135
 
While both the UK and EU legislation, however, apply to issues such as the provision of 
information to consumers, rights of withdrawal, liability, delivery and passing of risk they do 
not address the issues of property rights as the subject matter of a contract cannot be 
considered unfair and is out with the scope of this legislation.
136
 As a result s these laws could 
apply to the parts of the contracts regulating sale of the licence for using software (the first 
layer of VWs) but the second and third layers are players‟ creations and would not therefore 
fall within the definition of goods and services found in the consumer protection laws: They 
are not goods nor services sold by the developers.  
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Alternatively, the application of a piece of legislation that refers to unfair terms in any 
contract (and not just consumer contracts) could be considered: the UK Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. Application of this Act however does not extend to contracts dealing in any 
way with IP and includes within its scope exclusion and limited contract clauses only.
137
 
Similar, though much more limited protection can be found in California in the US, mandated 
through the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (2006). This legislations includes the prohibition 
of the previously discussed unconscionable provisions in the contract.
138
 
So far, VWs contracts have not been challenged much in the US and UK courts. In fact, in 
the UK, there is no such a case at the time of writing. The US case law is more developed, 
and the Bragg and Evans courts did find certain provisions of the contracts unfair (relating to 
jurisdiction and account suspension). Nevertheless, the court‟s deliberations on the property 
rights have been quite accidental and have been carried out in the context of discussing the 
main legal issues of a case. Therefore, court cases should not be relied upon to come in and 
resolve the issue of virtual property any time soon. Even if more cases do appear the 
outcome, at least in the US, might not be beneficial for the players.
139
  
To conclude, VW contracts at the moment deny the players virtual property rights in their 
creations and VW items. However, the courts have occasionally attempted to address the 
balance via doctrines of unfairness in contracts offering a potential solution. In principle 
however, the question of creating and/or recognising proprietary rights and interests in VWs 
is not an issue that can be regulated by contracts but rather is one of the general laws of 
property/IP. In addition, an attempt to applying consumer protection law to VWs EULAs and 
the allocation of property therein is contrary to the views of many authors mentioned in the 
subsequent section and their viewpoint that VWs are not just games and their players not just 
users but rather active participants, citizens, and residents of the world.  
5. Constitutionalisation of VWs 
In addition to the function of contracts in allocating ownership of virtual assets they also have 
another important function: governance of the VWs. This section aims to demonstrate this 
significance and to explore how these contracts in essence resemble real world constitutions. 
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Contracts in VWs are an effective and significant regulatory tool in VWs,
140
 giving users 
usually only a “take it or leave it” option as mentioned in the section above.141 Using mainly 
contracts VW developers have retained “omniscient and godlike” powers when it comes to 




Lastowka compares this order to a feudal order under which sovereigns have almost 
unlimited rights over their vassals and act as governors of a separate jurisdiction, with a 
separate economy and governed by a distinct body of law.
143
 Jankowich coined a useful term 
for this regulation: “EULAw”, characterised it as “non-negotiated, infinitely modifiable, 
proprietor-friendly regulation”. 144  This is not a new phenomenon though, as a similar 
situation exists for all the standard-terms contracts. What makes these contracts different is 
the substance that they attempt to regulate in their provision – different issues that are not 
susceptible to contractual regulations. 
The rules of EULAs and ToS govern both the legal and environmental aspects of VWs such 
as etiquette, game rules, player conflicts, in-game crimes, privacy policies, business policies, 
real world law of contracts, property, IP, and dispute resolution.
145
 In this way the contracts 
are also hybrid contract/property documents, granting the players, in some cases, limited 
property/IP rights in their creations (e.g. Second Life) and exceeding the principle of privity 
of contracts (their binding nature between the parties only) or, in civil law terms, in personam 
nature.
146
 Therefore, these contracts create pseudo-property, pseudo-torts, pseudo-criminal 
and pseudo-constitutional systems.  
Apart from the ex-ante rule making by contract, the providers also have a very strong 
mechanism of enforcement through code (both software and architecture) by restricting 
access to the world ex post. The providers have abilities to change the worlds in any way they 
wish; to change its landscape, design functionalities and the player‟s abilities (what can and 
cannot be done in a certain world, who can join the world and who needs to be expelled for 
example).
147
 As noted by Mayer- Schönberger and Crowley, one of the most effective 
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methods of enforcement for the breach of EULAs provision is expulsion, as users incur 
significant costs when forced to leave the world both in social terms (lost social capital, 
friends, built reputation, and ties with their avatar) and financial (lost monthly subscription 
fees and loss of all virtual property).
148
 They therefore rightly label VWs as “the most 
Lessigian of all spaces of online interaction.”149 Erlank agrees going even further, claiming 
that “there is no room for manoeuvre when a player gets to deal with the program code”.150  
No matter how powerful code is in restricting players‟ behaviour it has not been used 
pervasively to regulate all the possible relations within VWs. Rather, for some of the 
controversial issues a preferred regulatory modality has been contracts.  
Contracts accompanied with code, therefore, are the main governing modalities of VWs. 
Effectively, through contracts, developers often regulate issues that in real world could not be 
thus regulated; creating different quasi-legal regimes. Mayer- Schönberger and Crowley 
characterise this phenomenon as constitutionalisation of VWs.
151
 Similarly, Suzor notes the 
constitutional tensions in VW regulation. He argues for a reconceptualisation and evaluation 




The phenomenon of constitutionalisation could be seen as a consequence of VWs being 
“places” with their own social interactions and culture, mimicking in this sense the real-
world.
153
 The social significance and features of VWs have indeed been studied by many 
economists, anthropologists, psychologists, computer scientists and lawyers who have 
embarked the task of explaining different social phenomena within VWs.
154
 All these 
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individual, social and economic characteristics of VW encourage writers to claim that the 
worlds have “significance above and beyond their importance in the game context.” 155  
Therefore “VWs are online places where games are usually played”.156 VWs are qualitatively 
different from other kinds of games and from real world social interaction because of the 
unique interplay of their features; especially the fact that these interactions happen in an 
environmentally peculiar 3D world. 
The physicality, or environmentality of VWs is devised in order to either mimic real worlds 
quite realistically or to create imaginary, graphic, 3D environments that enhance users 
experience and immersion.
157
 Consequently, there is a much richer potential for creation and 
building in VWs in comparison with, for instance, social networks. The option and tools for 
creation are much more limited on social networks as a result of their web-based interface 
and lack of physicality. Therefore, any comparison in the size of user base or implications 
that the user might have encounter, when migrated to social networks, issues of inadequate 
analogy as the experience and reasons for joining these different platform are, at the 
moment,
158
 very different. 
To conclude, is it clear that the present form of regulation of contracts and code is inadequate 
and insufficient to regulate VWs and the relationships between the players and providers of 
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them as the outcomes are often arbitrary and ad hoc.
159
 These quasi-constitutions are thus 
unsuitable and there is a definite need for more certainty and accountability. Recognising the 
features of VWs – their distinct character and place-like qualities – it is necessary to provide 
for a better legal and regulatory regime to protect their citizens.
160
 
6. Property alternatives 
The analysis has so far been normative and theoretical with reference to the law. In the 
subsequent sections however the analysis will become more doctrinal with the aim  of 
reflecting legally the peculiar nature of VWs. It is argued here that virtual property and full 
ownership, for the reasons identified when discussing virtual property justifications and 
features above, is not an adequate solution. Such an approach would be prejudicial to the 
interests of either the players or the developers in turn. We therefore need more nuanced 
solutions that could serve as a compromise between these.  
A number of proposals have already experimented with property interests other than full 
ownership. They come in the forms of lesser proprietary rights, derived from another 
person‟s full ownership. In civil law systems these rights are known as servitudes (real – 
following an immovable property; and personal – attached to a person, allowing him to enjoy 
a property of another).
161
 In common law, lesser proprietary rights are usually only attached 
to immovables (real property), and are represented by easements or freehold covenants.
162
  
It is argued that these rights can serve best to take into account the fact that the interests and 
rights of the players are based on someone else‟s property (namely the first layer; the 
developer‟s code and servers). Notwithstanding the global reach of VWs, the proposals will 
experiment with both civil and common law concepts to try and identify commonalties and 
strike the best balance. It is not asserted here, however, that these concepts should or can be 
merged or borrowed from in either of the real world jurisdictions. The proposal is limited to 
VWs as separate, peculiar places.  
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6.1. Virtual easement  
An interesting proposal comes from Slaughter who, analysing benefits and drawbacks of 
introducing a property or contractual regime for VWs, comes up with the concept of “virtual 
easement.” He claims that this servitude would feature many beneficial aspects: 
transferability (from one user to another, in life and on death); longevity (for as long as the 
user invests time and/or money and the VW exists); liability (no property remedies); in rem 




This theory appears as a rather original and good compromise between the rights of users and 
those of the service providers. However, the flexibility it offers could be perceived as a 
possible source of uncertainty for the players, since different service providers could chose 
different terms to their detriment. This is usually not the case with servitudes in the real 




Similarly, the system of easements (the common law counterpart of the civil law servitudes) 
has been argued for by Lastowka in his later work.
165
 He sees it as the best solution as both 
the players and virtual world owners are interested in something that depends,  essentially, on 
one tangible thing: the servers owned by the providers. Therefore, in order to enable rights on 
the top of this ownership interest it is necessary to introduce lesser rights for the benefit of 
VW inhabitants.
166
 He does not however suggest what features this model could have.  
A similar solution was offered by Fairfiled, in his later work.
167
 Under the model he proposes, 
the licence agreement would also recognise covenant-style interests or servitude of the 
users.
168
 The problem with easements, covenants and leaseholds would be that, by definition, 
these interests are related to land, immovable property.
169
 In order to apply them therefore  
                                                          
163
 J Slaughter “Virtual Worlds: Between Contract and Property” (2008) Yale Student Scholarship Papers. Paper 
62, at 48 available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/62 (accessed 04 Dec 14). 
164
 This principle permeates legal writings referring to civilian systems, their mandatory rules for property and 
rigidity, as van Erp notes: „As a result, property law became rather petrified legal area, rooted in a desire for 
legal certainty.‟ S Van Erp “Comparative Property Law” in R Zimmermann and M Reimannk (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1044.  
165




 J Fairfield “Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds” (2008) 53 McGill Law 
Journal 427-476. 
168
 Ibid, at 451-457. 
169
 See e.g. C Van Der Merwe and A L Verbeke (eds), Time Limited Interests in Land (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); or Restatement Third, Property (Servitudes) § 4.6.Restatement Third, Property 
(Servitudes) § 1.1 Restatement Third, Property (Servitudes) § 1.2 





we would have to use the somewhat inadequate analogy between land and the developer‟s 
server systems.   
6.2. Intangible usufruct 
Another solution is suggested by Veloso, who introduces the concept of “intangible 
usufruct”. He asserts that this is a good solution for the practical reason that it avoids one-
sided arguments and thus aims to provide a way out of the unfair contracts while still 
respecting the developer‟s interests.170  
He proposes three rules to govern the relations established by usufruct. First, that the 
developer should be considered the owner and, by virtue of contract, should provide for the 
right to use and the right to the fruits of such use for the user. These rights are alienable, and 
when bundled together should form a virtual property right.
171
 Second, the developer may 
undertake any works and any improvements or diminution on virtual property and/or the VW, 
but under the condition that such acts are not exercised arbitrarily where they cause a 
diminution in the value of the usufruct or otherwise prejudice the right of the user.
172
 Thirdly, 
if the VW is terminated the players are considered to have returned their virtual property to 
the developer thereby absolving him from any complaint that might arise.  
This approach appears reasonable and the solution in this paper will build upon this proposal 
to develop it more in detail, especially in relation to the issue of transmissibility and to take 
into the account the different conceptions of servitudes (usufruct) between legal systems. 
6.3. Proposal: VWs usufruct 
Usufruct is a civil law concept, and does not have to pertain to immovables; it can be created 
over both movable and immovable property.
173
 It essentially entitles a person to the rights of 
use of and to the fruits on another person‟s property.  
The problem of using this concept for VWs, arguably, would be its application to the 
common law systems as similar concepts in these systems (easements, liferent) which apply 
to immovable property (or real property in English law) have very different effects in terms 
of duration, use, transfer etc.. Nevertheless, even thought it could be argued that it is not clear 
whether life estate in common law (the concept resembling usufruct most) is applicable to 
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 McClean argues that there is no actual difference in substance between these 
two.
175
 In addition, in a mixed legal system such as Scotland an arguably compromising 
interest already exists;  liferent, as the right to use other‟s property for life.176  
Now, returning to the initial premise that VWs are worlds of a particular kind and that 
protection of their players‟ virtual items has both not been regulated so far and does not seem 
to fit within the current conceptions of property, it seems reasonable to suggest a compromise 
solution which creates, in essence, a new legal concept that is peculiar to the VWs. This does 
not mean, of course, that the worlds are not still subject to the other relevant real world 
legislation.  
A potential new model would be a combination of Slaughter‟s virtual easement and Veloso‟s 
intangible usufruct, under the term of “VWs usufruct”. Features of this would include: the 
right to use; to transfer items; to exclude other users (if applicable, according to the nature of 
the world); longevity (for the life of the user or as long as he continues to play); liability with 
limitations in cases of VWs improvements and justified termination; and in rem nature (good 
against the whole world). This concept would pertain to the second level virtual assets. The 
focus here will be on the implications of this concept to the transmission on death. 
7. Transmission on death 
Currently, virtual assets are only subject to a contractual right. Contractual rights and 
personal contracts however will be discharged on death unless there is an opposite provision 
in the contract.
 177
 As all contracts expressly exclude survivability, the transmission on death 
of VW assets is under the current regime impossible. 
Most legal commentators who have analysed transmission of digital assets on death did not 
discuss VWs separately and gave rather vague ideas about transmission of virtual assets. The 
rare exception is Truong. She proposed that the developers retain ownership in virtual assets, 
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but lease these assets to the players. She, however, confuses lease with licence and proposed 
something that does not really suit the nature of virtual assets discussed in this paper.
178
  
For transmission, conversely, Truong proposed that the courts honour the wishes of players to 
convey value of virtual assets where these are expressed. Otherwise, if the players fail to do 
so, the contract will be the default position.
179
 This mechanism would mean that the players 
would be able “to transfer the non-monetary value of their virtual property to their immediate 
family members”,180 but that they would only be able to transfer the whole account and not 
any individual item of monetary value due to the conflicting interest with the providers.  
This solution is quite contradictory, as it proposes non-monetary transfer so as to abide by the 
contractual agreements and avoid conflict but at the same time violates the contractual 
provisions of non-transferability. Therefore, the mere aim it wishes to achieve is contradicted 
by the solution proposed. 
It is proposed here that second level assets are, however, more complex and that their 
transmission would depend on the commercial value of these assets. Thus, since usufruct 
would terminate on death the personal representative would be required to assess whether any 
of these rights could be monetised on the recognised auction sites and then, by accessing the 
account (as generally envisaged by the US Uniform Law Commission in the Draft Fiduciary 
Access To Digital Assets Act)
181
, they would sell these rights and transfer the monetary value 
to the player's heirs. This way, the heirs would not access the account, and therefore avoid 
violating many EULAs, but would still benefit from any monetary interests produced therein. 
This solution would however need to be enacted by relevant legislation in the individual 
jurisdictions (e.g. in the US, provisions from the Draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
to be enacted by the state laws; relevant legislation in the UK and other European countries). 
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 „Unless otherwise provided by the court or the will of a decedent, a personal representative of the decedent 
may access: 
(1) the content of an electronic communication sent or received by the decedent only if the electronic-
communication service or remote-computing service is permitted to disclose the content under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2702(b) [as amended];  
(2) the catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by the decedent; and   
(3) any other digital asset in which the decedent at death had a right or interest.‟ National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act,  s. 3, June, 2014 Drafting 
Committee Meeting, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014am_ufadaa_dr
aft.pdf (accessed 03 Dec 14). 






This paper assessed the nature, features and importance of VWs in relation to the rights of 
their players and, more specifically, the transmission of the players‟ interests in VWs 
accounts on death. The analysis tackled the concept of virtual property, its potential 
justifications and its features. It also discussed the current state of allocation of property in 
VWs, arguing that the features of VWs and their peculiar nature deserve reflection in EULAs 
as the quasi-constitutions of VWs.  
Recognising the conflicting interests of the developer and players, the paper proposes a 
compromise solution in the form of virtual usufruct. In relation to post-mortem transmission, 
it is suggested that any monetary interests originating from a player‟s account should be 
extracted and passed on.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the solution here is in the form of a principle, without going 
into the technical details of succession law. Rather, the aim of this paper is to provide some 
guidance on approach based on the analysis of the previous literature on virtual property and 
taking into account the EULAs provisions and special features of VWs. 
